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SPEECH ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MAY 1, 1981*
Paul E. Wilson
Each springfor the pastfew years Professor Wilson spoke
at the noon forum on his involvement in Brown v. Board of
Education. Each year the talk grew more popular. The text
below is a near verbatim transcriptionof last spring's talk.
It would be remiss if we did not emphasize this fact,
because Professor Wilson is a craftsman with the written
word, and this speech, transcribed by students, is not as
smooth nor as organized as Professor Wilson's writing. It
is, however, one imperfect way of preserving,for all of his
students, the vision of Professor Wilson in the classroom.
This memory deserves preservation.

I am greatly pleased that so many of you have chosen at
this very busy season to put aside an hour to listen to an elderly
man reminisce about his brief visit to Camelot. I am going to
talk about things that happened long ago. I am not going to
attempt to analyze the issues or the impact of Brown v. Board of
Education. I'll leave that to scholars like my brothers Heller,
Kissam, and Westerbeke. (Laughter) I am going to talk about
facts; facts as I remember them, and remember, I am
remembering a long time. The world has turned over more than
10,000 times since the events about which I will speak, and
memory grows indistinct; so, if I remember some things less
than accurately, or if I remember things that really didn't
happen, but ought to have happened, I hope you will be patient.
I suppose that everyone here knows that Brown v. Board of
Education is the case that ended legally sanctioned racial
segregation in the public schools of this country. Possibly not
* © 1981 Kansas Law Review. Originally published at 30 Kan. L. Rev. 15 (1981);
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everyone here knows that Brown was not one case, but five

cases. Along with Kansas in defending policies that produced
racial segregation in public schools were Virginia, South
Carolina, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. The District
of Columbia case involved an issue somewhat different from
those in the state litigation, but each of the cases raised the
ultimate issue of whether the Constitution permitted racial
segregation in the public schools.
The state cases were disposed of in a single opinion which
is captioned Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. You may
wonder why we call the case Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, because obviously, the South Carolina and Virginia
cases affected more people and were more spiritedly contested.
It's just a matter of chance. The Kansas case happened to be
appealed first; it occupied the highest position on the docket of
the Supreme Court. Therefore, it provided the name by which
the consolidated opinions in the four cases have from that time
been known.
There were some other matters of chance, matters of
fortuity, in this case that have interesting if not significant
implications. For instance, Linda Brown is a folk heroine of the
civil rights movement. There is talk of building a statue of her
on the campus of Washburn University, where I went to law
school. (Laughter) Actually, Linda Brown was only one of many
plaintiffs in these cases. There were 20 plaintiffs in the Kansas
case and there were multiple plaintiffs in each of the others. But
whoever heard of Victoria Lawton, or James Emmanuel, or
Nancy Jane Todd-probably no one in this room. But we've all
heard of Linda Brown for the purely fortuitous reason that her
name appeared first in the list of plaintiffs in the first case to be
docketed in the Supreme Court. We may have thought that her
name appeared first because Brown appears earlier in the
alphabet, but the attorney who prepared the complaint in the
Topeka case told me that they put the names on the pleading at
random, and the way the ball bounced put Linda at the head of
the list.
There was another fortuitous circumstance I'll talk more
about later; my own role in the case. Certainly I had not planned
on it, nor was I prepared for it. There was nothing in my
professional experience that indicated that I was an appropriate
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person to even participate in a case of this magnitude. I just
happened to be the person who was beckoned by the fickle
finger of fate. (Laughter) And here I am. (Applause)
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Frequently the question was asked and is asked: Why
Kansas? After all, Kansas is the bastion of freedom. In
proportion to population, Kansas sent more men to the Union
Army than any other state. Kansas is the place where John
Brown got his start. How in the world did Kansas happen to be
aligned with Virginia, South Carolina, and Delaware in
defending this vestige of black slavery? In order to answer that
question, let me look briefly at history. Now I'm sure there are
historians here, and I'm sure I shall make some mistakes, but
please don't embarrass me in front of all these people by
correcting me. (Laughter)
We all know that until the time of the Civil War, slavery
and its extension was a paramount political and social issue in
these United States. Slavery existed in the South as the basis for
the economy and the way of life, and people in the South were
anxious to protect the institution. Slavery, economically, was
less feasible in the North, so the people of the North could
afford to be righteously concerned about the moral issues. This
contention continued from the beginning of the United States
until it was terminated in the Civil War. The Free State areas
were more heavily populated than the South, so the South saw
its principal protection in the United States Senate. By
preserving a balance between free states and slave states in the
United States Senate, the South could prevent Congress from
enacting legislation unduly prejudicial to the existence of
slavery. Consequently, in the period before the Civil War, as
new states were created the South competed for the allegiance of
the new states to reserve this balance in the Senate.
In the first 30 or 40 years of the nation, this balance was
maintained pretty well. You may remember from history the
Missouri Compromise of 1820, by which Missouri was admitted
as a slave state, but prohibiting the further extension of slavery
north of the line that is roughly the southern boundary of
Missouri.
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Between 1820 and 1854, eight new states were created, and
five were admitted without slavery. The balance was being
disturbed. Thus it became particularly important for those who
sought to safeguard slavery to add to the numbers of states that
were represented in the United States Senate by proslavery
senators. In 1854, under the aegis of Stephen Douglas, the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill was passed. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill
provided that notwithstanding the Missouri Compromise, when
the Kansas and Nebraska territories were ready for statehood,
their character with respect to slavery would be determined by
the voters of the territories: the principle of "squatter
sovereignty." Consequently, a race was on. In the words of a
famous Civil War General, who could get their "fustus with the
mostest men" got the mostest votes. (Laughter)
At the outset, the proslavery forces were in the ascendancy.
They didn't have to come so far; most came from Missouri,
Kentucky, and Arkansas. The antislavery people also got
organized and began to encourage immigration to Kansas. They
came from New England and the Middle Atlantic States and the
Middle West, and as you Kansas historians know, within a few
months the competition had become intense, often erupting into
overt warfare. This was the time when the journalists in the East
spoke of the territory as "Bleeding Kansas." As the conflict
progressed, however, it became apparent that the antislavery
people were going to win, and in 1861, Kansas became a state
under a constitution prohibiting slavery. So much for your
history lesson.
The fact that Kansas had rejected slavery did not mean that
they had accepted racial equality however; quite the contrary.
The antislavery forces in the Kansas territory coalesced in the
Free State Party, and one of the consistent planks of the Free
State platform was that blacks should be excluded from the
territory and from the state. They didn't want slavery, but they
didn't want black people either. The same view was expressed
by early constitution makers. The proposed Topeka constitution
contained a provision that excluded blacks from the territory. It
was submitted to a referendum and passed by a vote of two to
one, but was not accepted by Congress for other reasons. The
Wyandotte constitution, which was adopted, both prohibited
slavery and allowed black immigration. Still, Kansas practiced
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discrimination both formally and informally. Initially, blacks
could not vote, not until the post-Civil War amendments. They
couldn't serve on juries in Kansas. They couldn't serve in the
militia. In addition to these kinds of legal discriminations, our
society was teeming with actual, informal discrimination. When
I lived in Topeka before World War II, blacks were not
permitted to swim in most of the pubic swimming pools. Blacks
were not permitted to attend most of the movie theaters, and
when they were allowed to do so, they were segregated in a
special section in the balcony. I remember time after time being
in restaurants with prominently displayed signs reading
"Coloreds and Mexicans served in sacks only."
When I say these things, I'm not indicting Kansas. I love
Kansas with all of its faults. But the things we saw in Kansas
were simply indicative of an attitude toward race that was
pervasive in this country until recently. This was part of the
American culture, and Kansas was part of America. So when
people say to me "Why Kansas," I reply, "Why not Kansas?"
SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN KANSAS

My assignment is to talk about public school segregation in
Kansas and how it ended, but let me first consider how it began.
In territorial days no provision was made for the schooling of
black students. This may not have been very significant, because
there were very few blacks in the territory. When Kansas
became a state, the laws generally provided that local districts
could determine their own policies and might or might not
establish racially segregated schools. In 1876, the Kansas school
laws were codified and the new school code contained no
express authorization for the maintenance of separate schools,
creating the inference that Kansas had abandoned the policy of
segregation.
In 1878 and 1879, a phenomenon occurred that history
sometimes calls the "Black Exodus." Due to black apprehension
at the ending of Reconstruction and the effective promotion of
counterparts of our present day real estate developers and travel
agents, a great many black people migrated from the South to
Kansas, Nebraska, and other states in the area. It is estimated
that in 1878 and 1879, 30,000 (there is no accurate census)

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

blacks moved from Mississippi and Tennessee and elsewhere in
the South to Kansas. Thirty thousand may not seem like a very
large number, but Kansas was not as heavily populated then as
now, and the migration did produce an impact. These people
were poor; many came up the Mississippi and Missouri rivers in
boats, getting off in Kansas City, Leavenworth, and Atchison,
and working their way into Topeka and beyond. As I said, they
were poor. At least a third became objects of public charity, and
this aroused the resentment of the people in the towns. This
resentment may have led to the passage in 1879 of a law
permitting, but not requiring, cities of the first class (over 15,000
people) to maintain separate schools on the elementary level
only. You may think the impact of that legislation was fairly
limited, but for the black people, it was not limited, because
most lived in cities of the first class, and most black students
who went to school did not go beyond the elementary grades.
Therefore, this limited legislation permitted the racial
segregation of most of the blacks who went to school in that
day. That 1879 law remained the law of Kansas until 1954,
when it was stricken down in Brown v. Board of Education.
There was only one amendment before 1954, and that permitted
Kansas City, Kansas to maintain a black high school, also.
Segregation in the public schools was assumed at that time
to be a valid policy. It was justified on the basis of Plessy v.
Ferguson, decided in 1896, in which the Supreme Court said
that so long as public facilities were equal in their objective
characteristics, there was no denial of equal protection of the
law because of mere separation. Plessy v. Ferguson involved
public transportation, not public education. Nonetheless, on the
basis of that opinion, the courts justified separate but equal
segregation policies in many different areas. Around the fourth
and the fifth decades of this century, blacks became increasingly
impatient with the results of separation in public education
because, in most parts of the country, the facilities for the blacks
were not equal to those provided for others. They were
separated, and then neglected. Under the leadership of the
NAACP in the 1930s and 1940s, black plaintiffs successfully
carried a great deal of litigation to the Supreme Court attacking
racial separation in public education. You remember some of
these cases: Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada; Sipuel v.
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Oklahoma; Sweatt v. Painter; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents. All of these cases, though, involved higher education,
and each involved something more than mere separation, usually
inequality or actual discrimination. Therefore, none of the cases
brought into issue the constitutional validity of the separate but
equal doctrine in public education By about 1950, the NAACP
was ready to test the validity of separate but equal on elementary
and secondary levels. They filed several lawsuits, one in
Topeka.
In 1950 there were twelve cities in Kansas that were
authorized to maintain separate schools, and of course, Topeka
was one of the cities. There were then twenty-two elementary
schools in Topeka; eighteen were white and four were black.
Both sides conceded, and the federal court found, that they were
of equal quality, according to objective criteria: they had equally
good buildings, equally good equipment, equally qualified
teachers. The only difference in the treatment of the blacks and
the white students was that the blacks were bussed. The four
black schools were scattered throughout the city, and
consequently the Board of Education provided the black
students with bus facilities that were not provided to the whites
who attended school closer to home. Of course, this was quite a
different bussing than we now experience in litigation, because
bussing was then employed to implement a policy of
segregation, not integration.
As I said, Topeka was selected as one of the target areas for
the attack upon separate but equal. Topeka was selected because
it was one of the few districts in the country, I suppose, where
there were separate schools which were in fact equal. Therefore,
it was one of the few places where the doctrine of separate but
equal could be challenged without some extraneous
considerations of inequality.
Early in 1951 a group of plaintiffs in Topeka, with the
assistance of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, filed a case in
the federal district court seeking to enjoin the maintenance of
separate schools in Topeka on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutional. In a case like this a three judge federal court is
convened, and it was convened. And when a suit seeks to enjoin
enforcement of a state statute on the claim of unconstitutionality,
notice must be given to the governor. Notice was given to the
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governor, and he was given the opportunity to answer the suit
and defend the statute. The governor and the attorney general
had a conference. They decided the attorney general would file
an answer, and he did file an answer, but in that answer, he
simply denied that the statute was unconstitutional. He did not
say anything about what Topeka was doing; for all the pleadings
showed, he didn't know and didn't care what Topeka was doing.
(Laughter) The trial was in the summer of 1951, and the
Attorney General's Office did not participate in the trial, except
to enter an appearance. Eventually, after the trial was ended, the
case was decided by the three judge court in favor of the Board
of Education and against the plaintiffs. But the three judge
district court made one interesting finding, that later assumed
significance in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The district court found that the
segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. Further,
the impact is greater when it has the sanction of law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. This sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to retard the education and mental development of
the Negro children, and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school
system.
In spite of that finding, the district court felt that it was obligated
to find for the Board of Education based on Plessy v. Ferguson,
and because by objective standards the schools were equal. The
Supreme Court of the United States relied on this same finding
to find a denial of equal protection under the law. You may be
wondering when and how I get into this case. Well, now let me
tell you; from here on it is kind of a personal memoir.
ENTER, PAUL WILSON

In late 1951, I went to work in the Attorney General's
Office. I was not particularly young. Professionally, I was kind
of a slow starter. Maybe I'm a slow finisher, too. (Laughter) I
had been out of law school for twelve years. I had been in the
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military service four years, and I'd practiced down in Osage
County, south of Topeka. I'd been a county attorney. I'd been an
attorney for a state department. And in 1951, I went to work in
the Attorney General's Office. One of the reasons I went there
was that I had no appellate experience, and I wanted to get some
experience on that level. (Laughter) Shortly after I got into the
office, the attorney general had a conversation with me.
First, I guess I neglected to mention, but you may have
inferred, the plaintiffs who lost in the district court appealed to
the Supreme Court. In the case of a three judge district court,
you don't go through the court of appeals, but appeal directly to
the Supreme Court. Anyway, the attorney general said that we
had this case, and he wanted to go and argue it, but he wanted
me to work on the brief and he also wanted me to go to
Washington when he argued it, and he would get me admitted to
the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. And of course
I was overjoyed. There are lots of lawyers who practice a
lifetime and are never admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court
of the United States, and here I was on the threshold of that
achievement. So, I began to get familiar with the case; I began
also to get familiar with the rules of the Supreme Court. I got my
papers for admission on file, so I would be ready to be admitted
when I arrived there. Then, to my dismay, I discovered I didn't
have anything to wear. (Laughter)
The traditional dress before the Supreme Court is a black
morning coat and gray striped trousers. But I was so recently out
of Osage County, Kansas, that I suppose it is understandable that
my wardrobe did not include garb of that kind. (Laughter) As an
alternative, the rules permitted appearance in a dark business
suit, but I didn't have that either. (Laughter) I had a tan
gabardine, I had a black and white, known as a pepper-and-salt
tweed, I had some sport jackets and some miscellaneous pants,
but nothing that would fit the rule. So, I decided I'd better get a
dark suit. I went down to the Palace Clothing Company that
used to be in Topeka, as some of you may remember; it was
kind of a poor man's Jack Henry. (Laughter) I looked around
and I found a double-breasted, dark blue suit, that then fit me
like a glove, and I decided, that's what I am going to wear to the
Supreme Court. So I had them lay it away for me. It cost $40,
and I didn't have $40 available then. And besides, I wanted it to

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

be new when I wore it to Washington, so I paid $5, and had
them lay it away.
Then some things happened that I had not anticipated.
Segregation had been a controversial matter in Topeka, and
there was a vocal minority of the school board that wanted to
eliminate segregated schools as a matter of local policy. In the
election in the spring of 1952, the anti-segregation minority
became the majority and took control of the Board. Shortly after
the Board was reorganized, it announced its intention not to
resist the appeal in Brown v. Board of Education. The attorney
general was dismayed when he learned of this, because he had
many friends in the black community and he had always enjoyed
their support and prized their friendship. So, he announced that
this was the Board of Education's case, and if they were not
going to resist it, then the attorney general was not going to take
care of their dirty linen for them by making an appearance
assuming responsibility for defense of the trial court's decision.
He told me to put the file aside, and go out and look for slot
machines. (Laughter)
So, I stopped work on Brown, but it caused me a lot of
misgiving. It seemed to me that as a matter of professional
responsibility, when you have a case in the Supreme Court of
the United States, you ought to do something about it: you ought
not to let it go down the drain, summarily. And besides, I had
my blue suit laid away, and it didn't look like I'd have anywhere
to wear it. (Laughter)
Anyhow, things went along in that posture all summer.
There was a lot of concern expressed by the southern lawyers,
because these cases were assigned for argument one after the
other; the first Kansas, then South Carolina, then Virginia, then
the District of.Columbia, and then Delaware. Virginia and South
Carolina thought that if Kansas failed to appear and let the
matter go by default, it would not do much for the atmosphere in
which their cases were to be heard and decided. They exerted all
kinds of pressures on people in Kansas to get the attorney
general involved, but he was determined that he would not.
The case was set for argument on December the 8th, 1952.
On November 24 of 1952, the Supreme Court made an
interesting order. It's found in the U.S. Reports, at 344 U.S. 141.
It concludes:
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Because of the national importance of the issue presented,
and because of its importance to the state of Kansas, we
request that the state present its views at oral argument. If
the state does not desire to appear, we request the attorney
general to advise us whether the state's default shall be
construed as a concession of invalidity.
Kansas was on the spot. At the time the order came over
the wire, the attorney general was out of state. He didn't get
back until two or there days later. Obviously, we could not
concede the invalidity of a statute that had been passed by the
legislature, and in at least six cases had been held valid by the
supreme court of the state. We had to do something. So, the
attorney general sent a wire to the Clerk of the Supreme Court
saying: Kansas will be there. Kansas will appear and argue and
file a brief.
Then, he called me to his office, pointed to a stack of files,
and said, "Take the damn thing and do what you can with it."
(Laughter) When I think of these events, I am reminded of
something that I read long ago in my course in Shakespeare
Rapid Reading: (Laughter) "Some are born great, some achieve
greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them."
(Laughter) I went to work. The first thing to do was to write a
brief, because I had no brief.
I worked weekends, and I worked during Thanksgiving
vacation; there really weren't very many weekends. I have a
quote here from a book I wanted to read to you, mainly to call
your attention to the fact that I'm mentioned in a book.
(Laughter) This is Kluger, Simple Justice. He said:
Working steadily, sleeping little, Wilson turned out a
concise, direct, and clearly competent brief. Kansas was not
coming to the Supreme Court to argue the economic,
sociological, ethical, or religious desirability of school
segregation. Its only concern in appearing was to defend
the state's right to permit such a practice.
Then he further discusses our argument, but that, of course, was
the gist of it: under the federal concept, under all the precedents
that we knew, the maintenance of public education policy within
a state was the business of the state, not of the Supreme Court of
the United States.
I got my brief written. I had arranged with the state printer
to expedite its printing and on a Saturday morning, before the
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case was set to be argued on Tuesday, I got on a train headed for

Washington, with forty copies of my brief in my briefcase. I
wanted to go on the train because I hadn't had any time to think
about my argument, and it took 28 hours for the train to get from
Topeka, Kansas to Washington. I had a drawing room, and in
that 28 hours, I thought and made notes and arrived in
Washington on Sunday evening, ready to argue in the Supreme
Court.
When I got off the train, I bought a newspaper in the
station. I looked at the headlines and it said, "Legal Titans to do
Battle in the Supreme Court." (Laughter) I began to read, and it
occurred to me, "Why, they're talking about me." (Laughter)
But I read a little further, and I discovered they were really
talking about the attorneys in the Virginia and South Carolina
cases; John W. Davis, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood
Robinson, and Attorney General Lindsay Almond. In the last
line it did say, "The State of Kansas will be represented by
Assistant Attorney General Paul Williams." (Laughter)
Anyhow, from the station I went to the hotel-the Carlton
Hotel, a gracious old hotel. When I registered, there were two
messages waiting for me; one from my adversaries who wanted
to get a copy of my brief, and one from the attorneys for the
other states, who wanted to be sure I was really there, if there
was such a person as me. (Laughter) So I went first to the hotel
of my adversaries across the street, and there I met men who
have since become great. Well, actually they were great thenThurgood Marshall, Robert Carter, and Spottswood Robinson
III. They were confident, cordial, agreeable men.
I delivered my brief to them, and went back and made
contact with the attorneys from the other states who, if not my
colleagues, shared a common interest with me. And they, too,
were clearly confident, gracious, and agreeable men. I delivered
my brief to them, and we agreed to meet the following evening
to plan our strategy. Then I went to my room, and I was there
only a short time when the phone rang.
Now this has always puzzled me, how these people knew I
was there. A voice on the other end of the wire said, "Mr.
Wilson?" and I acknowledged my identity. (Laughter) He said,
"This is the 20th Century Escort Service. Would you like some
company this evening?""(Laughter) Well, not being very
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imaginative, and a little slow witted, I said no. But I've often
wondered what might have happened if I had said yes.
(Laughter)
The next evening I met with my colleagues. Included in
that group was John W. Davis, who was representing the state of
South Carolina. John W. Davis was perhaps the greatest
constitutional lawyer of this century. He had held numerous high
positions in the government, he had been the Democratic
candidate for President in 1924, and, after his defeat, he had
gone to New York and become the head of one of the great Wall
Street law firms.
He was in the case because he was a personal friend of the
governor of South Carolina. He was then in his eightieth year.
That evening for two hours, he took me under his wing and gave
me a course in appellate argument; I had never argued an appeal.
I hadn't even had a course in appellate advocacy. (Laughter) But
here I was, ready to go to the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of the century, being instructed by the greatest
constitutional lawyer of the century. It was great! When we
separated, he inquired if I had been admitted to the bar of the
Court, and I replied I had not. He said, that he'd be glad to move
my admission. I had made arrangements for someone from the
office of Senator Schoeppel to move my admission, but when
Mr. Davis made his proffer, I thought, "To hell with Andy
Schoeppel." (Laughter) The next noon when the Court
convened, he stood up with me and vouched for my character
and professional qualification, and his name will always appear
on my certificate of admission to the Supreme Court, which I
display in my office alongside the plaque indicating that I am a
member of the Leavenworth County Bar's Order of the Smiling
Bull. (Laughter)
Eventually, the cases were called for argument. My case
was first, but fortunately I was the appellee, and my adversary,
Mr. Robert Carter, had to speak first for the appellant. So I got
to observe him, and the Court's treatment of him, before I had to
stand on my feet. All this time I was sitting beside John W.
Davis, and he was passing notes to me, telling me what to say in
response to the argument, and if the Court asked me this
question, what to say in answer to it. It did give me some
security, but not much. Finally Mr. Carter sat down, and the
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Chief justice, who was then Fred Vinson, smiled at me and said,
"General Wilson." I was an assistant attorney general, and he
was giving me the benefit of my dubious status. And so I stood
up and began to talk. Surprisingly, I could make sounds, and the
sounds were relatively coherent. (Laughter) Mr. Kluger says
about my argument:
Paul Wilson climbed to his feet for the first time before the
Supreme Court, and proceeded to deliver a perfectly able, if
somewhat simplistic, argument for the State of Kansas,
following closely the arguments he had made in his brief.
Kluger was writing in 1975, and we've become a lot more
sophisticated than we were in 1952. Maybe if he'd been writing
from the perspective of 1952, he wouldn't have found my
argument so simplistic. (Laughter) I don't know whether Kluger
liked me or not. In his book, at one point he made this, I guess,
unsympathetic comment: "By eastern standards, Paul Wilson
was a hayseed. His background and practice as a lawyer did not
seem to qualify him very well for the roles thrust upon him, as a
reluctant dragon defending his state's Jim Crow public schools."
But still, in his book generally he treated me kindly, so he may
have felt sorry for me. (Laughter)
Anyway, at the argument, after I began to talk, I enjoyed it.
The Court asked me many questions and they were kind
questions. They seemed designed to help me develop my
argument. After using not all of my time, but as much as I
needed, I sat down. And the next cases were heard.
I came back to Kansas, and we waited until Spring for word
about the case. Finally the word came, and the cases had been
restored to the docket for further argument the next December.
This time the Court had directed that the arguments focus on the
intent of the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the intent of the legislatures that ratified it, as to its effect on
public education. This time, of course, I had plenty of time. I
was an experienced Supreme Court advocate. I was in touch
with the outside world. (Laughter)
So I prepared a brief during the summer and got ready to go
back and argue. But in the meantime, the city of Topeka sort of
pulled the rug out from under me by announcing that they were
going to abandon the policy of segregation. Still they hadn't
abandoned it, and the plaintiffs still claimed that the statute was
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unconstitutional, so I felt the case remained alive. Anyhow, I
went back to Washington this time, and did not experience the
uneasiness that I'd experienced on my first trip, but instead I felt
sort of secure. Also, I had with me a prepared argument, a
prepared speech, and I was going to stand there, and unless the
Court digressed too much, I was going to present my prepared
speech. The other time I had only some notes on the margin of
my brief.
Again Brown v. Board of Education led off. Mr. Carter
began to argue, but Justice Frankfurter interrupted him, and he
said, "Mr. Carter, isn't your case moot?" Justice Frankfurter
apparently read the newspaper. And Mr. Carter very graciously
said, "Well, I'd like to have General Wilson address that
question." There was nothing at all about mootness in my
prepared speech. (Laughter) I responded as best I could, and
finally Earl Warren, who had become the Chief Justice after the
death of Fred Vinson said, "I don't think the case is moot.
We've invited General Wilson to come here and speak, and I
propose that we let him present his argument." And Justice
Frankfurter said no more, but it was obvious to me that they did
not want to hear extended argument in this case. So the
argument I gave was quite an abbreviated tone, and not the one
that I had prepared. For 28 years I have cherished the manuscript
of that speech, hoping to find a place to give it. (Laughter)
Again, the Court took the case under advisement, and again
it was spring before an opinion was announced, and you know
of course what the opinion was. There were further arguments,
directed at how the decree should be implemented, that is, how
segregation should be phased out. Those arguments were in the
spring of 1955, about a year after the decision. But during these
first two arguments I'd gotten pretty good press in this part of
the country, so the third argument was made by my boss.
(Laughter) I went along, but I just carried the papers. Anyhow, it
was all a great experience.
Now, when I make these presentations, I ask a bit of
personal license, to say a word in my own defense, my own
behalf. It is commonly assumed that I was on the wrong side of
this case. From the standpoint of winning or losing, I was. From
many standpoints I was. You know, my children have always
been kind of embarrassed about the role their daddy had in
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standing before the Supreme Court defending racial segregation.
They feel about this like they feel about all those times that
daddy voted for Nixon. (Laughter) Frequently, I have been
introduced at meetings as the lawyer who was on the wrong side
of Brown v. Board of Education, and people look at me as
though I must be some kind of a racist. My response is that I'm
not a racist, I am a lawyer, and in our society a lawyer's role is a
useful and honorable one. We choose to decide issues of this
kind in an adversary process, and before wise decisions can be
made by courts, the courts must be fully informed. The job of
the lawyer is to inform the court as to the merits in the position
he represents. Here, the Supreme Court was being asked to
decide one of the most important issues of the century. It was
being asked to reverse the trend of the law, because our
decisions did support the policy that was under attack. It was
being asked to reverse a trend that was supported by the values
that society had traditionally held. If it was to decide the issue
correctly, the justices needed to be fully informed. The Kansas
position was not a frivolous one. It was supported by precedent,
by tradition, by history, and the values in our culture. I think I
probably said all that could be said for the State of Kansas. I said
it as well as I could say it, and in doing that, I think I performed
a service to the Court and to the State of Kansas.
And now, if I may exhibit a bit more paranoia. (Laughter) I
suppose the person who was best able to evaluate my
performance was my good adversary, Robert Carter. After the
decision, we corresponded. In his first letter to me he said:
We are certain that your purely lawyerlike examination of
constitutional power, unfettered with emotions and
demagoguery, helped embolden the court to make its
courageous and statesmanlike declaration of May 17.
However poorly stated, this is meant as a tribute to your
honesty and integrity as a member of the bar and an official
of the State of Kansas.
(Applause) He may have been just being nice. I hope he meant
it.
There is one more thing that I might say. I'm not at all sure
that I lost in Brown v. Board of Education, because if I had not
been in that case, I would not be here today, wearing my blue
suit, and talking to you. And it is a pleasure. Thank you.
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(Applause)
The single word applause is misleading. As Professor
Wilson finished with "thank you," the entire room of
people shot to its feet, and loud applausefilled the airfor
over two minutes. Professor Wilson stood at the front of the
room, wearing the same blue suit he wore before the
Supreme Court, shaking his head and smiling in disbelief
Like Spottswood Robinson, John Davis, and the others in
Brown, "clearly a confident, gracious, and agreeable
man. " And much more. Professor Wilson, thankyou.
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